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DISAGREEING OVER AGREEMENTS: 
A CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF 
NO-POACHING AGREEMENTS IN 
THE FRANCHISE SECTOR 
Catherine E. Schaefer* 
 
In October 2016, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division announced 
its intent to proceed criminally against parties to no-poaching agreements, 
or agreements between or among employers not to hire each other’s workers.  
Consequently, a wave of class action antitrust lawsuits has raised questions 
about the legality of no-poaching or no-hire provisions that certain 
franchised food businesses use.  Fast-food restaurant chains, including 
McDonald’s, Carl’s Jr., and Pizza Hut, have recently found themselves 
embroiled in such litigation.  This Note examines prior antitrust litigation 
involving no-poaching agreements between companies and discusses the 
differences and similarities between these cases and the cases involving 
franchised businesses.  In analyzing the key issues that courts must confront 
to resolve current and future cases specific to franchises, this Note proposes 
that courts should employ a per se rule against no-poaching agreements 
among franchisors and franchisees. 
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INTRODUCTION 
According to a 2018 study conducted by Jobvite,1 82 percent of workers 
in the United States are currently seeking new job opportunities.2  Yet, to 
seamlessly switch jobs is not feasible for all employees in the U.S. job 
market.  Imagine for a moment that you are a manager at a McDonald’s 
franchise.  Every day you travel to work by bus, but your shift routinely runs 
so late that you miss the last bus home, leaving you no choice but to walk 
five miles home.  After being promised, yet passed up for, promotion after 
promotion, you finally decide to apply for a job at a different McDonald’s 
closer to your home.  However, you are barred from this opportunity because 
of the franchise’s rule against intracompany hiring.  This is the reality that 
 
 1. Jobvite is a recruiting and software corporation. See We Eat, Sleep, and Think About 
Recruiting, JOBVITE, https://www.jobvite.com/company/ [https://perma.cc/3UPC-J8JH] (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 2. 2018 Job Seeker Nation Study:  Researching the Candidate-Recruiter Relationship, 
JOBVITE (2018), http://www.jobvite.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/2018_Job_Seeker_ 
Nation_Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6AT-HVFG]. 
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workers in the fast-food industry, such as Leinani Deslandes, must endure.3  
In 2017, Deslandes filed a class action complaint alleging that the no-
solicitation and no-hiring agreement4 between and among McDonald’s USA, 
LLC, McDonald’s Corporation, and their franchisees is a violation of section 
1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.5 
While employers can only take limited measures to restrict competition in 
the labor market,6 some employers, like McDonald’s, have been able to take 
advantage of no-poaching agreements.7  No-poaching or no-hire agreements 
are agreements between or among employers not to hire each other’s 
workers.8  Deslandes alleged in her complaint that these agreements are 
intended to prohibit other franchisees from hiring away their employees.9  
Additionally, these agreements may restrict competition for potential 
employees between franchisees and company-owned stores in violation of 
section 1 of the Sherman Act.10 
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) reserves criminal antitrust 
prosecutions for horizontal, per se agreements, which include price-fixing 
and market-allocation agreements.11  In October 2016, the DOJ Antitrust 
Division announced its intention to proceed criminally against those engaged 
in naked no-poaching and wage-fixing agreements.12  These cases, 
particularly in the fast-food industry, raise additional questions about 
mobility restriction and wage suppression in already low-wage industries.13  
 
 3. Rachel Abrams, Why Aren’t Paychecks Growing?  A Burger-Joint Clause Offers a 
Clue, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/business/pay-
growth-fast-food-hiring.html [https://perma.cc/WT9Y-7R2A]. 
 4. See Michael Lindsay et al., Employers Beware:  The DOJ and FTC Confirm That 
Naked Wage-Fixing and “No-Poaching” Agreements Are Per Se Antitrust Violations, 
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2016, at 1, 1 n.2. 
 5. See Amended Class Action Complaint ¶ 1, Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 
17-4857, 2018 WL 3105955 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2017), ECF No. 32 [hereinafter Deslandes 
Complaint]. 
 6. Michael Lindsay & Katherine Santon, No Poaching Allowed:  Antitrust Issues in 
Labor Markets, 26 ANTITRUST, Summer 2012, at 73, 73–74. 
 7. David K. Haase & Darren M. Mungerson, Agreements Between Employers Not to Hire 
Each Other’s Employees:  When Are They Enforceable?, 21 LAB. LAW. 277, 277 (2006); see 
also Lindsay et al., supra note 4, at 1 n.2. 
 8. See Lindsay et al., supra note 4, at 1 n.2.  “No-poaching agreements are also called 
no-hire, no-interference, non-solicitation, or no-switching agreements, depending on the 
circumstances.” Id.  This Note uses the terms “no-poaching” and “no-hire” interchangeably. 
 9. Paul M. Eckles et al., Spotlight on No-Poach Agreements Continues, Expands to New 
Industries, SKADDEN ARPS SLATE MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (Oct. 17, 2018), 
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2018/10/spotlight-on-no-poach-agreements-
continues [https://perma.cc/V7JC-8KZU]. 
 10. Id.; see also Rochella T. Davis, Talent Can’t Be Allocated:  A Labor Economics 
Justification for No-Poaching Agreement Criminality in Antitrust Regulation, 12 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 279, 282 (2018). 
 11. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL III-12 (5th ed. 2018). 
 12. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN RESOURCE 
PROFESSIONALS 3 (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/ 
992623/ftc-doj_hr_guidance_final_10-20-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/7W63-ZX4R]. 
 13. See ALAN B. KRUEGER & ERIC A. POSNER, A PROPOSAL FOR PROTECTING LOW-INCOME 
WORKERS FROM MONOPSONY AND COLLUSION, HAMILTON PROJECT 4 (2018), 
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In the franchise context, these practices stifle the labor market and prevent 
workers from achieving their full earnings.14 
The question remains whether no-poaching agreements are ancillary to 
franchise agreements or are illegal under the Sherman Act.15  Furthermore, 
if a franchise system is not exempt from section 1 despite technically being 
a single corporate entity, can it then demonstrate legitimate business goals 
for wage suppression and similar anticompetitive behavior?16  The answers 
to these questions are not obvious, in part due to disagreements among legal 
scholars and economists over the overarching purpose of U.S. antitrust laws.  
Some argue that proscribing private power, rather than promoting 
efficiencies, is the primary impetus behind American antitrust laws.17  This 
distrust of private power is the “one central and common ground that over 
time has unified support for antitrust statutes.”18  Conversely, the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC)—an executive agency responsible for enforcing 
antitrust laws—states that the purpose of U.S. antitrust laws is to “promote 
vigorous competition and protect consumers from anticompetitive mergers 
and business practices.”19 
In the no-poaching context, Joseph Harrington, professor of business 
economics and public policy at the Wharton School, has stated that in terms 
of suppressing competition, “companies agreeing not to compete for each 
other’s employees is the same as companies agreeing not to compete for each 
other’s customers.”20  Professor Harrington goes on to say that, “[i]n the 
latter case, it results in customers paying higher prices because of the lack of 
competition, and in the former case it results in workers receiving lower 
wages because of the lack of competition.”21  The solution to the no-poaching 
 
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/protecting_low_income_workers_from_monops
ony_collusion_krueger_posner_pp.pdf [https://perma.cc/LS8N-SMU6]. 
 14. Letter from Senators Elizabeth Warren and Cory A. Booker to Jeff Sessions, U.S. 
Att’y Gen. 2 (Nov. 21, 2017), http://www.scribd.com/document/365092277/2017-11-21-
Letter-to-Sessions-on-No-Poach-Agreements [https://perma.cc/DR8L-P22J]. 
 15. Barbara T. Sicalides & A. Christopher Young, Fast-Food Chains Agree to End 
Franchise No-Poach Restrictions, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP (July 13, 2018), 
https://www.pepperlaw.com/publications/fast-food-chains-agree-to-end-franchise-no-poach-
restrictions-2018-07-13/ [https://perma.cc/485S-Q5QL]. 
 16. KRUEGER & POSNER, supra note 13, at 4–5. 
 17. See Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust:  A New Equilibrium, 66 
CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1153 (1981). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Guide to Antitrust Laws, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-
guidance/guide-antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/R5AH-JRLR] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019); see 
also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (“Taken as a whole, the 
legislative history illuminates congressional concern with the protection of competition, not 
competitors . . . .”).  See generally Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2253 (2013) (discussing the Court’s shift of emphasis from competition to consumer 
welfare and evaluating other prominent antitrust propositions). 
 20. Silicon Valley’s No-Poaching Case:  The Growing Debate Over Employee Mobility, 
WHARTON U. PA. (Apr. 30, 2014) [hereinafter Silicon Valley’s No-Poaching Case], 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/silicon-valleys-poaching-case-growing-debate-
employee-mobility/ [https://perma.cc/S2GC-52B2]. 
 21. Id. 
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issue in franchise systems, therefore, turns on which interests ought to be 
promoted and protected. 
This Note addresses antitrust issues with respect to no-poaching 
agreements by exploring the economic impact of these types of agreements 
in the Silicon Valley technology industry, where gentlemen’s agreements, or 
anti-poaching and wage-fixing agreements, have become common practice 
among U.S. employers.22  A recent study reveals that no-poaching 
agreements are similarly common in the franchise sector, particularly in the 
fast-food industry, which raises a host of issues regarding their legality.23 
This Note proceeds in four Parts.  Part I provides a historical and legal 
backdrop of antitrust law and describes the basic principles of a violation 
under section 1 of the Sherman Act—including the different categorizations 
of trade restraints—and the methods courts use to analyze alleged violations. 
Part II then discusses the history of no-poaching agreements.  This 
discussion includes a detailed analysis of In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust 
Litigation,24 which provides a contemporary exemplar of how no-poaching 
agreements in the unfranchised technology industry impede competition by 
artificially suppressing wages and restraining employee mobility. 
Using the analysis outlined in Part II, Part III demonstrates how no-
poaching agreements in the franchise sector,25 such as the one at issue in 
Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC,26 differ from unfranchised industries 
with respect to legal, economic, and public policy perspectives.  Part III also 
shows how no-poaching agreements in the franchise sector produce 
anticompetitive effects similar to the agreements used in unfranchised 
industries.  It addresses the defenses franchisors proffer and the technically 
vertical arrangements involved; yet Part III argues that these 
characterizations should not be dispositive in the antitrust analysis. 
Finally, Part IV further argues that, depending on the nature of the 
agreement, and the amount of coordination and control involved in the 
franchise system, no-poaching agreements in the franchise industry are akin 
to horizontal customer-allocation agreements and that no-poaching 
agreements interfere with competition in the labor market in many of the 
same ways.  As a result, courts should consider these types of agreements to 
 
 22. See infra Part II.B. 
 23. See Alan B. Krueger & Orley Ashenfelter, Theory and Evidence on Employer 
Collusion in the Franchise Sector, IZA INST. LAB. ECON. 2–4 (July 2018), 
http://ftp.iza.org/dp11672.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC4D-QTAV]; see also How Fair—or 
Legal—Are Non-Poaching Agreements?, WHARTON U. PA. (July 17, 2018), 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/how-fair-or-legal-are-non-poaching-agreements/ 
[https://perma.cc/33HX-NAUU]. 
 24. 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2012); see infra Part II.B (providing an in-depth 
analysis of the types of agreements made by technology companies). 
 25. Other franchised industries under scrutiny include hotels, convenience stores, and the 
following services:  car repair, home health care, cleaning, tax preparation, parcel, electronic 
repair, child care, custom window covering, travel, and insurance adjustment. See Eckles et 
al., supra note 9. 
 26. No. 17-4857, 2018 WL 3105955 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018); see infra Part III.B (using 
Deslandes as a case study for the effects of no-poaching agreements in a franchised system). 
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be per se illegal and look at the actual harm to employees rather than the 
technically vertical and single-entity designations of the companies that 
employ them.27 
I.  SHERMAN ACT SECTION 1:  A PRIMER 
This Part outlines basic antitrust law concepts and definitions, as well as 
principles specific to section 1 of the Sherman Act.  Part I.A begins with an 
introduction to restraints of trade and the different categorizations of 
restraints.  Part I.B introduces the two threshold questions associated with a 
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.  Part I.C describes the single-entity 
defense as an exemption to a section 1 violation and details its applicability 
to franchises with a focus on the current legal doctrine.  Finally, Part I.D 
reviews the three different modes of analysis that federal courts use to 
determine whether an agreement unreasonably restrains trade. 
A.  Restraints of Trade 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that “[e]very contract, combination 
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to 
be illegal.”28  In other words, the Sherman Act prohibits competitors from 
entering into agreements with one another that would restrain competition.29  
Although most claims under section 1 involve the restraint of trade in product 
markets, section 1 also applies to restraints of trade in labor markets.30  In the 
labor market, employers are purchasers and employees are sellers of labor.31 
In the October 2016 Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource 
Professionals, the DOJ averred that it will continue to criminally pursue per 
se violations of section 1.32  At the same time, it announced it would begin 
to characterize no-poaching agreements as per se violations.33  Naked 
horizontal agreements, which include agreements among competitors to fix 
prices or to divide markets, are per se unlawful.34  The DOJ also characterizes 
 
 27. See infra notes 41–47 and accompanying text (discussing vertical—as opposed to 
horizontal—restraints and the single-entity defense). 
 28. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).  Passed by Congress in 1890, the Sherman Act was the first 
antitrust law—a “comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and 
unfettered competition as the rule of trade.” Guide to Antitrust Laws:  The Antitrust Laws, 
FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-
laws [https://perma.cc/BCQ8-LQK8] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 29. Davis, supra note 10, at 284. 
 30. Marc Edelman, Are Commissioner Suspensions Really Any Different from Illegal 
Group Boycotts?  Analyzing Whether the NFL Personal Conduct Policy Illegally Restrains 
Trade, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 631, 639 (2009). 
 31. See, e.g., Eichorn v. AT & T Corp, 248 F.3d 131, 140–41 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(acknowledging that the labor market is a market for antitrust purposes). 
 32. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, supra note 12, at 3; see also Davis, supra note 10, at 288. 
 33. Davis, supra note 10, at 288. 
 34. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007); 
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 434–36 (1990) (explaining that a 
horizontal agreement among lawyers to refuse to represent criminal defendants until their fees 
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naked no-poaching agreements as per se violations, and it therefore intends 
to prosecute these types of agreements criminally.35 
Courts will find a violation of section 1 if a no-poaching agreement 
(1) serves no legitimate purpose, or (2) serves a legitimate business purpose 
but is not narrowly tailored to its purpose.36  Conversely, courts will evaluate 
the nature of the restraint if it is ancillary as opposed to naked.37  Ancillary 
restraints are “those that are part of a larger endeavor whose success they 
promote.”38  For example, a restraint is ancillary if it is reasonably necessary 
to achieve increased productivity and output.39  Ancillary restraints, unlike 
naked restraints, are analyzed under the rule of reason and typically survive 
this analysis.40 
Another distinction is whether the restraint is horizontal or vertical.  
Whether the restraint is horizontal—among companies competing at the 
same level of the production and distribution process—or vertical—between 
companies competing at different levels—has been a key issue because 
courts almost invariably apply the per se rule to horizontal agreements.41  A 
horizontal agreement not to hire competitors’ employees is an example of 
market division.42  Thus, the DOJ has warned employers that it considers 
naked horizontal no-poaching agreements per se unlawful.43 
However, not all horizontal restraints are per se illegal.44  A court must 
distinguish between “naked” and “ancillary” restraints because this 
distinction determines which analytical test will be applied to the restraint.45  
Some horizontal restraints are considered ancillary if they are pro-
competitive, especially when they increase efficiency.46  For instance, no-
poaching agreements that are ancillary to the sale of a business can have pro-
 
increased was a naked restraint and per se unlawful); infra notes 100–02 and accompanying 
text (describing, in detail, the per se rule of illegality). 
 35. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, supra note 12, at 1–2. 
 36. See Mark L. Krotoski & Richard G. S. Lee, DOJ Antitrust Division Announces 
Imminent Criminal Prosecution for ‘No Poaching’ Agreements, MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS 
LLP (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/doj-antitrust-division-announces-
imminent-criminal-prosecution-for-no-poaching-agreements [https://perma.cc/5G7G-GEL9]. 
 37. See In re Wholesale Grocery Prods. Antitrust Litig., 722 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1093–94 
(D. Minn. 2010) (“Determining whether an agreement is ancillary requires a court to consider 
whether, at the time the agreement was made, it was necessary to promote the enterprise and 
productivity of an underlying arrangement.”). 
 38. Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust 
Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1221 (2008). 
 39. See id.; see also Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 
224 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 188–89 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 40. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 38, at 1221; see infra Part I.D (explaining the modes of 
analysis courts employ). 
 41. Davis, supra note 10, at 291–92. 
 42. See United States v. eBay, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1039 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 43. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, supra note 12, at 3. 
 44. See, e.g., Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 190. 
 45. Id. at 188–89; see infra Part I.D (discussing the modes of analysis). 
 46. Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 188–89 (“A court must distinguish between ‘naked’ restraints, 
those in which the restriction on competition is unaccompanied by new production or 
products, and ‘ancillary’ restraints, those that are part of a larger endeavor whose success they 
promote.”). 
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competitive effects, so such agreements are not automatically considered 
violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act.47 
B.  Threshold Questions 
Courts determine whether a particular restraint violates section 1 of the 
Sherman Act by answering two threshold questions.48  The first issue a court 
considers involves interstate commerce—“whether there is an effect on trade 
or commerce among more than one state.”49  It must be proved either that the 
defendants’ conduct was in interstate commerce or substantially affected 
interstate commerce.50  The second threshold issue is whether there is 
sufficient agreement among two or more parties to constitute a “contract, 
combination . . . or conspiracy.”51  If both elements are proven, the court then 
employs one of three modes of analysis—the per se test, the rule of reason 
test, or the quick-look approach (an abbreviated rule of reason test)—to 
determine whether a particular agreement unlawfully restrains trade.52  
Courts have interpreted restraint of trade to refer to only “unreasonable 
restraints.”53 
In no-poaching cases, the question of whether the alleged restraint affects 
interstate commerce is rarely in dispute.54  In franchise no-poaching 
agreements in particular, the interstate element is straightforward because the 
employers in question operate either nationally or in multiple states, and the 
agreements cover the individual franchises in multiple states across the 
United States.55 
What is less straightforward is whether no-poaching agreements in 
franchise systems involve an unlawful contract, combination, or conspiracy 
(often referred to as an “agreement”) among two or more parties.56  To prove 
a Sherman Act section 1 violation the plaintiff must demonstrate that an 
unlawful agreement has been made.57  However, the law has not been 
conclusive in stating whether a franchisor and its franchisees are capable of 
agreeing for purposes of establishing a violation of section 1 of the Sherman 
 
 47. Eichorn v. AT & T Corp, 248 F.3d 131, 144 (3d Cir. 2001).  Ancillary restraints are 
reviewed either under the rule of reason or under the quick-look approach. See infra Part I.D 
for a detailed delineation of the modes of analysis. 
 48. Edelman, supra note 30, at 640. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See, e.g., Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of the Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743–44 (1976); Gulf 
Coast Hotel-Motel Ass’n v. Miss. Gulf Coast Golf Course Ass’n, 658 F.3d 500, 507–08 (5th 
Cir. 2011). 
 51. Edelman, supra note 30, at 640. 
 52. Id. at 640–41; see Lemley & Leslie, supra note 38, at 1213. 
 53. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). 
 54. See, e.g., In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1115 n.10 
(N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 55. See, e.g., Deslandes Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 15. 
 56. See Barry M. Block & Matthew D. Ridings, Antitrust Conspiracies in Franchise 
Systems After American Needle, 30 FRANCHISE L.J. 216, 216–17 (2011). 
 57. Mary N. Strimel et al., No-Poach Agreements Land Franchisors in Hot Water, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.bna.com/nopoach-agreements-land-
n57982090975/ [https://perma.cc/2VDY-LXFY]. 
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Act.58  Nor is it settled law that a unilateral contract constitutes an 
agreement.59  The U.S. Supreme Court held in Copperweld Corp. v. 
Independence Tube Corp.60 that a parent company and its wholly owned 
subsidiary, as a single economic unit, were incapable of conspiring under the 
Sherman Act.61  The Court reasoned that because the parent corporation and 
subsidiary shared a complete “unity of interest”—meaning the parent could 
assert full control over the subsidiary—their collusion did not deprive the 
market of the “independent centers of decisionmaking that competition 
assumes and demands.”62 
C.  The Single-Entity Defense:  A Sherman Act Section 1 Exemption 
Courts disagree about the application of section 1 to agreements between 
separate legal entities under the same corporate umbrella, which most 
commonly involve a parent corporation and its less than wholly owned 
subsidiary.63  Joint ventures, or “entities created by two or more firms for the 
purpose of jointly engaging in some economic activity,” pose similar issues 
with respect to the applicability of section 1.64  At first glance, joint ventures 
appear to operate as a single firm in the market.65  Upon further review, 
however, it becomes clear that joint ventures are often managed by multiple 
separate firms that compete against one another.66  This creates the 
possibility for joint ventures to collude in violation of section 1.67 
1.  History and Evolution of the Single-Entity Doctrine 
Following the Copperweld decision, franchisors began to argue that a 
franchisor and its franchisees are technically a single economic entity and, as 
such, are incapable of entering into agreements in violation of section 1.68  
The Ninth Circuit weighed in on this very issue in the case Williams v. I.B. 
Fischer Nevada.69  In Williams, the plaintiff alleged that his employer’s 
franchise agreements, which barred Jack-in-the-Box managers from moving 
from one Jack-in-the-Box restaurant to another for six months without 
permission from the previous restaurant owner, violated section 1.70  The 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
 61. Id. at 777. 
 62. Id. at 769–71; see also Nathaniel Grow, American Needle and the Future of the Single 
Entity Defense Under Section One of the Sherman Act, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 449, 451 (2011). 
 63. Grow, supra note 62, at 450–51. 
 64. Id. at 451. 
 65. Id.; see also Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2006) (holding that the per se 
standard did not apply to the companies because they were involved in a joint venture and, 
therefore, were not competing with one another). 
 66. Grow, supra note 62, at 451. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Strimel et al., supra note 57. 
 69. 999 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). 
 70. Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nev., 794 F. Supp. 1026, 1029 (D. Nev. 1992), aff’d, 999 
F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); see also Lindsay et al., supra note 4, at 10–11. 
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district court held that the franchisor’s control over the franchisees and their 
shared economic goals “ma[d]e them a single enterprise, incapable of 
competing for purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.”71  The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed, holding that “[t]o be capable of conspiring, corporate 
entities must be ‘sufficiently independent of each other.’”72  The court 
concluded that the district court correctly held that the franchisor and its 
franchisees are clearly a “common enterprise.”73 
Following Williams, other federal courts outside the Ninth Circuit reached 
similar conclusions.  These courts held that franchisees and franchisors are 
not capable of conspiring to restrain trade, either because they are a single 
economic entity or, alternatively, because the franchise agreement was 
unilaterally imposed by the franchisor.74  However, in 2010, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held in American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League75 
that the National Football League (NFL), which is comprised of thirty-two 
separately owned, franchised football clubs, was “not categorically beyond 
the coverage of § 1.”76  When the NFL granted an exclusive license to 
Reebok to manufacture trademarked headwear for all thirty-two teams, 
former licensee American Needle claimed that the agreement violated the 
Sherman Act.77  In rejecting the league’s single-entity defense and 
determining that the teams could be capable of a section 1 agreement, the 
Supreme Court held that “the NFL’s licensing activities constitute[d] 
concerted action that [wa]s not categorically beyond the coverage of § 1.”78  
Here, the Court concluded that the Copperweld doctrine did not apply but 
rather that “[t]he legality of th[e] concerted action [by the NFL teams and the 
licensing entity] must be judged under the Rule of Reason.”79  The Court 
remanded the case to the lower court for further consideration.80  Despite this 
outcome, franchisors continue to rely on the single-entity defense, but this 
reasoning has become increasingly questionable, as co-franchisees operate in 
a competitive relationship with each other for some purposes, including the 
hiring of employees.81 
 
 71. Williams, 794 F. Supp. at 1032. 
 72. Williams, 999 F.2d at 447 (quoting Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Summa Corp., 610 F.2d 
614, 617 (9th Cir. 1979)). 
 73. See id. 
 74. See, e.g., Search Int’l, Inc. v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 621, 625 (N.D. 
Tex. 2001), aff’d, 31 F. App’x 151 (5th Cir. 2001); Hall v. Burger King Corp., 912 F. Supp. 
1509, 1548 (S.D. Fla. 1995). 
 75. 560 U.S. 183 (2010). 
 76. Id. at 186. 
 77. See Grow, supra note 62, at 470–71. 
 78. Id. at 475. 
 79. Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 186. 
 80. Id. at 204. 
 81. 3 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, 
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 16:43 (4th ed. 2017). 
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2.  Current Applicability to No-Poaching Franchise Cases 
Because American Needle did not adopt a clear single-entity standard, a 
court could find that a franchisor and franchisee are separate economic actors 
and subject to liability under section 1 of the Sherman Act.82  However, a 
franchise system can still argue that it should be treated as a single economic 
enterprise.83  A court’s analysis will vary based on the facts and 
circumstances of each case, namely based on the structure and operation of 
each franchise.84  The single-entity defense is more likely to prevail the 
“greater the amount of control of the franchise system that the franchisor 
exercises and the more the franchisor limits competition between the 
franchisor and the franchisees and among franchisees.”85  This defense has 
been applied differently by both federal and state courts, and as a result, the 
current doctrine remains open to interpretation.86 
The single-entity defense has gained significance in no-poaching cases that 
involve franchised systems.87  A 2018 study revealed that more than half of 
all companies with more than 500 franchise stores in the United States 
impose some kind of lateral recruiting restriction.88  Citing this study,89 
Senators Cory Booker and Elizabeth Warren charged that “fully 58 percent 
of the 156 largest franchisors operating around 340,000 franchise units used 
some form of anti-competitive ‘no-poach’ agreements.”90  Further, they 
noted that these agreements were particularly prevalent in low-wage, high-
turnover industries.91  The study highlighted that these agreements are 
common in franchise companies in industries with high labor turnover like 
quick service restaurants.92  In response to these developments, a number of 
private plaintiffs have filed class action complaints against their fast-food 
franchisor employers challenging the restrictive hiring and solicitation terms 
in their franchise agreements by alleging restraints of competition.93  The 
complaints in these cases argue that franchisees are not joint employers; 
 
 82. See Strimel et al., supra note 57. 
 83. Block & Ridings, supra note 56, at 223–24. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 221. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. at 216. 
 88. See Krueger & Ashenfelter, supra note 23, at 4; see also Abrams, supra note 3. 
 89. See generally Krueger & Ashenfelter, supra note 23 (finding that no-poaching 
agreements are more commonly used by franchises in low-wage and high-turnover industries).  
Franchises outside of the fast-food restaurant industry using similar no-poaching agreements 
include Jiffy Lube, H&R Block, and Anytime Fitness, LLC. Id. at 5–6. 
 90. See Letter from Elizabeth Warren and Cory A. Booker to Jeff Sessions, supra note 14, 
at 1. 
 91. See id. 
 92. Krueger & Ashenfelter, supra note 23, at 4–5, 9. 
 93. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint ¶ 1, Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, No. 
18-133 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2018), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Butler Complaint]; Class Action 
Complaint ¶ 1, Ion v. Pizza Hut, LLC, No. 17-788 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2017), ECF No. 1 
[hereinafter Ion Complaint]; Deslandes Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 1; Class Action Complaint 
¶ 1, Bautista v. Carl Karcher Enters., No. BC 649777 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 2017) 
[hereinafter Bautista Complaint]. 
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franchisees are third-party beneficiaries of the no-poaching agreements and 
other terms; franchisees compete against each other and against company-
owned stores; and, most notably, the no-poaching agreements restrict 
franchisees from hiring employees of other franchisees.94  The complaints 
further assert that the no-poaching provisions are horizontal restraints that 
are per se unlawful under the Sherman Act.95  In Deslandes v. McDonald’s 
USA, LLC, the court found a no-hire provision in a McDonald’s franchise 
agreement to be a horizontal restraint of trade.96  The court applied the quick-
look approach to analyze the defendant’s claim, despite finding that the 
parties were a single enterprise.97 
D.  Modes of Analysis 
Federal courts utilize one of three modes of analysis to determine whether 
a particular agreement unreasonably restrains trade:  the per se rule, the rule 
of reason, or the quick-look approach.98  Agreements that are considered per 
se illegal are condemned without further inquiry.  If the rule of reason applies, 
a court will balance all of the circumstances to determine whether there is an 
unreasonable restraint on competition.  The quick-look approach is an 
abbreviated rule of reason analysis, whereby a court may categorize a 
restraint without conducting a full-blown economic analysis.99 
The per se rule applies to restraints “that would always or almost always 
tend to restrict competition and decrease output.”100  If the restraint reduces 
output or increases prices but is unrelated to any joint economic activity, 
courts will typically deem it per se illegal.101  The per se category is narrow 
and reaches only conduct that is proved to be consistently anticompetitive 
through extended experience, such as “price fixing, bid rigging, and customer 
and territorial allocations.”102 
Conversely, if a restraint makes economic activity possible that would 
otherwise be impossible without the restraint, or if it contributes to an 
economically efficient outcome, then courts will typically review the 
 
 94. See generally Butler Complaint, supra note 93; Ion Complaint, supra note 93; 
Deslandes Complaint, supra note 5; Bautista Complaint, supra note 93. 
 95. See Butler Complaint, supra note 93, ¶¶ 19, 172; Ion Complaint, supra note 93, ¶¶ 1, 
10, 103; Deslandes Complaint, supra note 5, ¶¶ 12, 133. 
 96. Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17-4857, 2018 WL 3105955, at *6 (N.D. 
Ill. June 28, 2017); see infra Part III.B (discussing, in detail, the facts and issues of the case). 
 97. Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at *5. 
 98. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 38, at 1213–16. 
 99. Id. at 1215. 
 100. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (quoting 
Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp. 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)). 
 101. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 38, at 1221 (outlining the approaches courts take in 
analyzing agreements under section 1). 
 102. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at III-12 (2018); see, e.g., United States v. 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 212–13 (1940) (citing United States v. Trans-Missouri 
Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), and United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 
(1898), as examples of early cases holding that price-fixing agreements are per se violations); 
see also ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST HANDBOOK FOR FRANCHISE AND 
DISTRIBUTION PRACTITIONERS 4 (2008). 
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restraint under the more flexible rule of reason standard.103  Unlike the per 
se rule, there is no bright-line test for whether a restraint is illegal under the 
rule of reason.104  In applying the rule of reason, courts will “balance the pro-
competitive benefits of conduct against its potential for anticompetitive 
harm.”105 
In some cases involving horizontal agreements with pro-competitive 
justifications, courts will utilize a modified rule of reason analysis known as 
the quick look.106  Under this approach, the court will determine whether “an 
observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could 
conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive 
effect on customers and markets.”107  Using the quick-look approach, the 
court may determine whether conduct that appears to be anticompetitive on 
its face is per se illegal by considering the defendant’s pro-competitive 
justifications for the conduct.108  If the defendant can offer plausible 
economic reasons that the conduct is pro-competitive, the court will weigh 
the defendant’s competitive justifications against the alleged antitrust harms 
under the rule of reason.109  But if the defendant cannot offer sufficient 
justifications, the conduct is deemed illegal.110 
II.  A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF NO-POACHING 
ANTITRUST CASES 
Courts have traditionally analyzed no-poaching agreements under antitrust 
laws because the market for employee labor and skills is a market subject to 
the Sherman Act.111  That is, the labor market is a market for antitrust 
purposes, and no-poaching agreements can restrain competition among 
employers for workers.112  Part II.A chronicles the precedent of no-poaching 
cases, beginning with the case that first addressed the issue and ending with 
a more modern application.  Part II.B explores a contemporary no-poaching 
case involving Silicon Valley technology companies.  This analysis 
emphasizes both the legal and economic implications of no-poaching 
agreements and the anticompetitive harm they produce. 
 
 103. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 38, at 1223; see Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 
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 108. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 38, at 1215. 
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 111. See, e.g., Eichorn v. AT & T Corp, 248 F.3d 131, 140–41 (3d Cir. 2001); Cesnik v. 
Chrysler Corp., 490 F. Supp. 859, 864 (M.D. Tenn. 1980). 
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A.  Development of Antitrust Scrutiny of No-Poaching Agreements 
Historically, courts have applied the rule of reason to no-poaching 
agreements.113  In Union Circulation Co. v. FTC,114 one of the first cases 
concerning no-poaching agreements, the Second Circuit applied the rule of 
reason and found that the “no-switching” agreements unreasonably 
restrained trade.115  In this case, the court assessed the legality of an 
agreement among magazine and periodical subscription companies to refrain 
from hiring each other’s employees for specified periods of time, often one 
year.116  The companies claimed the agreements were created to promote 
professional conduct among salesmen in response to fraudulent practices in 
the industry.117  The companies argued that the agreements had a legitimate 
business justification—that without the agreements in place, the salesmen 
would be able to switch to another employer in the industry easily and 
companies would be less likely to curtail and eliminate fraudulent 
practices.118  The Second Circuit held that the companies had violated 
section 1 because the agreements harmed competition by “freez[ing] the 
labor supply.”119  The court reasoned that the agreement was not sufficiently 
tailored to deter fraudulent practices because it pertained to all salesmen; 
therefore, the agreement’s reach extended beyond what was reasonably 
necessary.120 
Although naked no-poaching agreements, like the one in Union 
Circulation Co., violate section 1, there are instances in which no-poaching 
agreements may be considered lawful ancillary restraints aimed at a 
legitimate business purpose.121  However, “businesses must carefully 
execute the agreements to ensure that they are narrowly tailored by scope, 
duration, job function, product type, geography, or a combination of these 
limits.”122  In 2001, the Third Circuit applied the rule of reason to a no-
poaching agreement in Eichorn v. AT & T Corp.123  Here, the court evaluated 
a no-poaching agreement between a parent company (AT&T) and one of its 
affiliates following a divestiture.124  The agreement in question applied only 
to employees who earned $50,000 or more annually and also included a time 
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 116. Id. at 654–55. 
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example of an ancillary restraint in the joint-venture context, see generally Texaco, Inc. v. 
Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006). 
 122. Davis, supra note 10, at 297; see Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 
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restriction of eight months.125  The court held that the limitation on both 
scope and duration was sufficient to make the agreement a reasonable and 
ancillary restraint.126  The court further stated that the agreement lacked a 
“significant anti-competitive effect” on labor in the industry by fixing 
wages.127 
B.  Case Study:  In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litigation 
In 2010, no-poaching agreements were the subject of litigation once again, 
this time involving several technology companies.128  The DOJ brought civil 
enforcement actions against technology companies for entering into no-
poaching agreements with one another.129  In these cases, the competitors 
agreed not to cold-call each other’s employees.130  Since the cases settled, 
the companies avoided public disclosure of their recruiting practices.131  
However, these cases had the residual effect of provoking discourse on the 
harm that no-poaching agreements can cause.132 
1.  Factual Background and Nature of the Agreements Made 
In September 2010, the DOJ filed a complaint against six high-tech 
companies—Adobe, Apple, Google, Intel, Intuit, and Pixar—alleging that 
their hiring-practice agreements violated antitrust laws.133  These agreements 
were not clearly pure no-switching agreements; instead they restricted the 
companies from cold-calling each other’s employees.134  For example, the 
companies in this case135 had entered into a series of bilateral “Do Not Cold 
Call” agreements from 2005 to 2007, whereby each company’s recruiting 
department refrained from cold-calling the employees of the other 
company.136 
In December 2010, the DOJ filed a second complaint against Lucasfilm 
and Pixar alleging that the two companies had agreed to restrictions beyond 
 
 125. Id. at 136–37. 
 126. Id. at 148. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Lindsay et al., supra note 4, at 6–8. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Silicon Valley’s No-Poaching Case, supra note 20. 
 132. Id. 
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followed the DOJ investigation. In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 
1108 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
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telephonically, or electronically. See id. at 1111; see also Consolidated Amended Complaint 
¶ 42, In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. 11-
CV-02509-LHK), ECF No. 65 [hereinafter High-Tech Complaint]. 
 135. Competitive Impact Statement at 1–2, United States v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 10-cv-
01629 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2010), ECF No. 2 [hereinafter Adobe Competitive Impact Statement]. 
 136. In re High-Tech Emp., 856 F. Supp. 2d at 1110; see also Lindsay & Santon, supra 
note 6, at 75. 
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recruiting.137  The court found that the agreement between Lucasfilm and 
Pixar that was at issue138 contained the following terms: 
59.  First, each agreed not to cold call each other’s employees. 
60.  Second, each agreed to notify the other company when making an offer 
to an employee of the other company, if that employee applied for a job 
notwithstanding the absence of cold calling. 
61.  Third, each agreed that if either made an offer to such an employee of 
the other company, neither company would counteroffer above the initial 
offer. This third agreement was created with the intent and effect of 
eliminating “bidding wars,” whereby an employee could use multiple 
rounds of bidding between Pixar and Lucasfilm to increase her total 
compensation.139 
In both cases, the DOJ argued that the agreements were per se illegal.140  The 
cases settled and the court did not decide whether to apply the per se rule or 
the rule of reason, but the court accepted the government’s arguments that 
the restraint had depressed wages and restricted employee mobility.141  The 
court reasoned that a quiet “handshake agreement” between competing 
technology companies was adequate grounds for a per se antitrust claim.142 
2.  Labor-Economics Perspective and Restraint on Labor Markets 
If, for example, no-poaching agreements are restrictions on customers and 
not employees, the per se antitrust violation becomes clearer.143  From this 
viewpoint, the agreements would prohibit employers from calling each 
other’s customers, from requiring notice when offering to sell a product to 
another company’s customers, and from offering a lower price than what the 
other companies were offering.144  This type of agreement would result in 
higher prices for consumers due to the lack of competition.145  As an analog 
to workers receiving lower wages because of the lack of competition, this is 
a direct example of a market-allocation and price-fixing agreement, which is 
a per se violation.146 
In United States v. Adobe Systems, Inc.,147 the DOJ argued, “There is no 
basis for distinguishing allocation agreements based on whether they involve 
input or output markets.  Anticompetitive agreements in both input and 
 
 137. In re High-Tech Emp., 856 F. Supp. 2d at 1111; see also Lindsay at al., supra note 4, 
at 6. 
 138. Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Lucasfilm Ltd., No. 10-cv-02220 
(D.D.C. June 3, 2011), ECF No. 2 [hereinafter Lucasfilm Competitive Impact Statement]. 
 139. High-Tech Complaint, supra note 134, at 11; see Davis, supra note 10, at 281. 
 140. In re High-Tech Emp., 856 F. Supp. 2d at 1117. 
 141. See id. at 1123. 
 142. Id. at 1109; see Davis, supra note 10, at 281. 
 143. Lindsay & Santon, supra note 6, at 75. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See Silicon Valley’s No-Poaching Case, supra note 20. 
 146. Lindsay & Santon, supra note 6, at 75; see supra Part I (discussing the types of 
agreements proscribed by section 1 of the Sherman Act and the per se rule generally). 
 147. No. 1:10-cv-01629 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 18, 2011). 
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output markets create allocative inefficiencies.”148  The DOJ applied a 
similar analysis to employment markets in United States v. Lucasfilm Ltd.149 
by stating that “[a]ntitrust analysis of downstream customer-related restraints 
applies equally to upstream monopsony restraints on employment 
opportunities.”150  The DOJ correctly focused on the direct restraint that the 
agreements imposed on labor markets rather than the effects they have in a 
downstream market.151  This is because the anticompetitive effect of the 
agreements restrained competition for the services of highly skilled 
technology employees and deprived them of better job opportunities and 
potentially higher compensation.152  In analyzing the defenses, the DOJ 
acknowledged that, given the collaboration and business relationships 
between the companies, some of the restraints might have been justified.153  
However, the DOJ noted that even though the restrictions protected business 
interests, such as the investment in and training of employees, they were not 
sufficiently tailored to protect the interests of the employees.154 
III.  ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO NO-POACHING 
AGREEMENTS IN THE FRANCHISE SECTOR 
The use of no-poaching agreements in the franchise sector raises various 
issues—both legal and economic.  Using the analysis from Part II, Part III.A 
compares no-poaching agreements used in franchised and unfranchised 
industries to show that, while there are distinctions, the anticompetitive 
effects are similar.  Then, Part III.B analyzes the arguments proffered against 
no-poaching agreements in a pending case involving the fast-food franchise 
McDonald’s.  Part III.C discusses additional pending cases, and Part III.D 
reviews the validity of the complaints, weighing the defendants’ 
justifications against the harm caused. 
A.  Comparison of No-Poaching Agreements in Franchised and 
Unfranchised Industries 
No-poaching cases in the franchise sector differ from unfranchised cases, 
such as the high-tech cases, in two primary respects.155  One is a factual 
 
 148. Adobe Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 135, at 8. 
 149. No. 1:10-cv-02220 (D.D.C. June 3, 2011). 
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distinction regarding the nature of the entities that utilize the agreements at 
issue.156  In Adobe and in Lucasfilm, the agreements were among 
independent companies, whereas in franchise cases, franchisors mandate 
these agreements with their franchisees to prevent employees from leaving 
one franchise to work at another within the same corporate chain.157  The 
second distinction is a policy one—the former involves highly skilled 
technical workers and the latter involves lower-skilled workers in high-
turnover industries.158 
In fast-food restaurant franchise no-poaching cases, a franchisor and its 
franchisees have joint economic goals, including providing a uniform 
product, service, brand, and quality of service to the customer.159  In a recent 
settlement of a no-poaching agreement case outside the franchise context, the 
DOJ permitted the parties to enter into reasonable no-solicitation agreements, 
which were considered ancillary to a legitimate business collaboration.160  
Franchise cases differ to the extent that franchisees operate under a common 
corporate umbrella, yet they may also compete against one another in a 
variety of areas.161 
The range of competition between a franchisor and its franchisees will vary 
from one franchise system to another depending on factors such as “whether 
the franchisor operates company outlets, whether the franchisees are granted 
exclusive territories, and the geographic locations of the various outlets.”162  
The major factors in evaluating whether a franchisor-franchisee relationship 
is a single economic enterprise are revenue allocation, the level of 
coordination between the franchisor and franchisees, and the amount of 
control the franchisor exerts over the franchisee.163  While it is generally true 
that the franchisor and its franchisees share a common interest in promoting 
the franchise system, individual franchises are separately owned entities.164  
In many cases, individual franchise outlets, particularly in highly 
concentrated geographic areas, compete for customers and employees.165  
Courts must balance the arguments for (e.g., promoting the franchise 
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system’s efficiency) and against (e.g., limiting employees’ options) no-hire 
or no-poaching agreements.166  A recent wave of cases involving no-
poaching agreements among franchises demonstrates this tension. 
B.  Case Study:  Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC 
Leinani Deslandes started as an entry-level crew member and was initially 
paid $7.00 per hour at a McDonald’s franchise in Apopka, Florida, where she 
worked her way up into management.167  After years of working at the same 
location, Deslandes applied for a position with a competing McDonald’s 
restaurant in Orlando, Florida, that offered a higher salary and better working 
conditions.168  Deslandes received an offer from the Orlando McDonald’s; 
however, the following day, she received a call from the McDonald’s 
corporate office informing her that, due to a provision in the company’s 
franchise agreement, the restaurant could not hire her unless she was released 
by the Apopka McDonald’s.169  Since Deslandes could not be hired by 
another McDonald’s, she ultimately quit her job and was forced to take an 
entry-level position in another industry for lower pay.170  Deslandes brought 
a class action suit against McDonald’s claiming that the provision violated 
section 1 of the Sherman Act and state law.171 
The relevant provision from the McDonald’s franchise agreement, which 
is invisible to McDonald’s employees,172 stated: 
Interference With Employment Relations of Others.  During the term of 
this Franchise, Franchisee shall not employ or seek to employ any person 
who is at the time employed by McDonald’s, any of its subsidiaries, or by 
any person who is at the time operating a McDonald’s restaurant or 
otherwise induce, directly or indirectly, such person to leave such 
employment.  This paragraph [] shall not be violated if such person has left 
 
 166. See Strimel et al., supra note 57. 
 167. See Deslandes Complaint, supra note 5, ¶¶ 59–69.  After about three months working 
at the Apopka McDonald’s, Deslandes was promoted to Shift Manager earning $10.00 per 
hour, and in 2011, Deslandes was promoted to Department Manager of Guest Services earning 
$12.00 per hour. Id. ¶¶ 61–62. 
 168. Id. ¶¶ 66–67.  The complaint alleges that the Apopka McDonald’s violated overtime 
laws and cancelled Deslandes’s managerial training upon learning that she was pregnant. Id. 
¶¶ 64–65. 
 169. Id. ¶ 68. 
 170. Deslandes Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 71.  Deslandes took a job at Hobby Lobby, a 
retail store at a rate of $10.25 per hour. Id. 
 171. Id. ¶ 121. 
 172. These provisions are invisible to the employee because they are included in contracts 
between the franchisors and franchisees.  Evan Starr, assistant professor of management and 
organization at the Robert H. Smith School of Business at the University of Maryland, 
explains: 
The worker does not agree to this [agreement].  If they don’t get along with their 
manager, or if they learn that it’s not a good work environment, or perhaps they have 
to move locations for some reasons, and their skills are basically perfectly 
transferable to another franchise within that same company, then they’re not able to 
do that. 
How Fair—or Legal—Are Non-Poaching Agreements?, supra note 23 (alteration in original). 
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the employ of any of the foregoing parties for a period in excess of six (6) 
months.173 
McDonald’s argued that agreements in a franchise arrangement, like the one 
in question, are technically “vertical” rather than “horizontal,” which, if 
accepted, provides them more latitude under antitrust statutes and the mode 
of analysis courts decide to apply.174  However, the court here found that the 
agreement was horizontal and not entirely vertical—that the alleged restraint 
was ancillary to the McDonald’s franchise agreements and was horizontal 
with “vertical elements.”175  While the McDonald’s franchise agreement 
included a time restriction of six months, unlike some other franchise 
business models, it did not impose additional tailored restrictions, such as 
exclusive grants, exclusive territorial rights, protected territory, or any right 
to exclude or control.176  It also failed to tailor its conditions to the location 
or development of future McDonald’s restaurants at any time.177 
The district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the Illinois 
state law claims, but it denied the motion to dismiss the Sherman Act 
section 1 violation allegations.178  The court rejected the defendant’s 
argument that the no-poaching provision was necessary to protect itself from 
horizontal competition for employees because the legal issue “is not about 
competition for the sale of hamburgers to consumers.”179  Instead, “[i]t is 
about competition for employees.”180 
From a policy standpoint, the court also recognized that because most 
individuals in the low-skill employment market do not have the luxury of not 
working for a six-month period, “the no-hire provision effectively prevented 
competing McDonald’s franchises (as well as the company-owned stores) 
from competing for experienced, low-skill employees.”181  But the court 
ultimately concluded that the restraint did not constitute a per se unlawful 
restraint because the agreement was ancillary to otherwise pro-competitive 
franchise agreements as a whole.182  In other words, despite the restraint 
appearing to be facially anticompetitive, the court found that McDonald’s 
had successfully claimed an output-enhancing effect of a no-poaching 
 
 173. Deslandes Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 87 (alteration in original).  McDonald’s has 
since removed the no-hire and no-solicit provisions from its franchise agreement.  The plaintiff 
seeks damages for the opportunities she may have missed to switch franchises previously 
despite the fact that those opportunities are available now. Id. 
 174. Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at *6; see also KRUEGER & POSNER, supra note 13, at 
11. 
 175. Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at *6. 
 176. Id. at *1. 
 177. Id.; see also Deslandes Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 75. 
 178. Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at *1. 
 179. Id. at *8.  McDonald’s argued that the no-poaching provision promoted interbrand 
competition between McDonald’s and other fast-food chains, such as Burger King, rather than 
intrabrand competition between two McDonald’s franchises. Id. 
 180. Id. at *8. 
 181. Id. at *1. 
 182. Id. at *7. 
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agreement, which was sufficient to defeat a claim of a per se violation.183  
The court permitted the employee’s antitrust claim to proceed under a quick-
look analysis.184  As of this writing, this case has been appealed, though many 
legal experts believe that it is unlikely that the court’s ruling will be 
reversed.185  Due to the increased legislative and administrative pressure186 
to eliminate no-poaching provisions across the board, franchisors may 
ultimately decide that litigation is not worth the cost.187 
C.  Other Recent Relevant Cases 
Recently, additional franchises faced similar antitrust allegations resulting 
from their no-poaching provisions.188  In February 2017, two former shift 
leaders at Carl’s Jr., Luis Bautista and Margarita Guerrero, brought a putative 
class action suit against Carl Karcher Enterprises LLC (CKE), the parent 
company of fast-food chain Carl’s Jr.189  The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged 
that Carl’s Jr. Restaurants LLC and CKE required all franchisees to agree to 
 
 183. Id.; see also Fawn Johnson, Fair Play:  McDonald’s, Little Caesars Suits Tee Up 
Worker Questions, BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 16, 2018), https://www.bna.com/fair-play-
mcdonalds-b73014482562/ [https://perma.cc/3AFQ-8Q65].  The output effect was producing 
more burgers and fries. 
 184. Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at *7–8. 
 185. Rupert M. Barkoff, No-Poaching and Non-Compete Provisions:  Long-Time Practices 
Go Under the Microscope, N.Y.L.J. (Sept. 17, 2018, 2:40 PM), https://www.law.com/ 
newyorklawjournal/2018/09/17/no-poaching-and-non-compete-provisions-long-time-
practices-go-under-the-microscope/ [https://perma.cc/9GLF-8UY9]. 
 186. Id.  In March 2018, Senators Elizabeth Warren and Cory Booker introduced federal 
legislation prohibiting no-poaching agreements (the End Employer Collusion Act).  The 
Justice Department’s Antitrust Division likewise has begun investigations into several large 
franchisors that utilize no-poaching provisions. Id. 
 187. Id.  There are many franchisors that have voluntarily and preemptively abandoned 
their no-poaching provisions.  McDonald’s, for example, has eliminated the provision from 
new franchise agreements and indicated that it would not enforce such provisions contained 
in older agreements. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.  Recently, four fast-food 
chains—Dunkin’ Donuts, Arby’s, Five Guys Burgers and Fries, and Little Caesars—also 
agreed to end their no-poaching provisions. See Hailey Konnath, 4 More Fast-Food Chains 
Vow to End No-Poach Agreements, LAW360 (Mar. 12, 2019, 10:55 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/competition/articles/1138135 [https://perma.cc/QWT7-MCKG]. 
 188. See, e.g., Butler Complaint, supra note 93, ¶ 1; Ion Complaint, supra note 93, ¶ 2.  
There is also an effort at the state level to eliminate no-poaching provisions.  Washington State 
Attorney General Bob Ferguson filed a lawsuit against national sandwich chain Jersey Mike’s 
after the company refused to remove no-poaching provisions from its franchise agreements.  
The complaint alleges a violation of state competition laws, but the anticompetitive arguments 
are comparable. See AG Ferguson Announces Major Milestones in Initiative to Eliminate No-
Poach Clauses Nationwide, Files Lawsuit Against Jersey Mike’s, WASH. ST. OFF. ATT’Y GEN. 
(Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/ag-ferguson-announces-major-
milestones-initiative-eliminate-no-poach-clauses [https://perma.cc/5GKQ-XAG5]. 
 189. Braden Campbell, CKE Restaurants Hit with Antitrust Class Action, LAW360 (Feb. 8, 
2017, 4:26 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/889807/cke-restaurants-hit-with-antitrust-
class-action [https://perma.cc/8HL2-PKHD].  Carl Karcher Enterprises, LLC, through its 
subsidiaries, owns, operates, and franchises a chain of fast-food restaurants in the United 
States and internationally.  The company operates under the name Carl’s Jr. See Company 
Overview of Carl Karcher Enterprises, LLC, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=896644 [https://perma.cc/2S7C-FTQL] (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
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a no-hire provision that prevents one franchisee from hiring employees at the 
level of shift leader or higher from other franchisees without the franchisor’s 
advance written consent.190 
The CKE complaint deals exclusively with California state law.191  The 
no-hire provisions are alleged to be naked restraints of trade, which depress 
employee wages, restrict employee mobility, and reduce benefits and job 
growth opportunities for employees.192  The relevant provision from a CKE 
franchise agreement states: 
(2)  Accordingly, Franchisee covenants and agrees that, except with CKE’s 
prior written consent, during the term of this Agreement, and for a period 
of 2 years following its expiration, transfer, or termination, Franchisee shall 
not, either directly or indirectly, for itself, or through, on behalf of, or in 
conjunction with, any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or other 
entity: 
 . . .  
(b)  Knowingly employ or seek to employ any person then employed by CKE 
or any franchisee of CKE as a shift leader or higher, or otherwise directly 
or indirectly induce such person to leave his or her employment.193 
The terms of this agreement are narrower than the terms at issue in 
Deslandes because the terms only apply to those employed as a “shift leader 
or higher,”194 whereas the McDonald’s agreement pertained to “any person” 
employed.195  But the CKE agreement is also broader in that it does not 
specify a restricted time duration.196  The defendants allege that the CKE 
franchise model is designed to encourage franchise competition—by not 
providing exclusive geographic territories for its franchisees, each franchisee 
is encouraged to compete for both customers and employees.197  
Notwithstanding the no-hire agreement, CKE franchisees have publicly 
claimed that they have complete discretion over hiring decisions.198  Other 
recent lawsuits include similar allegations designed to show that the 
franchisees operate in competition against each other, as well as against 
company-owned stores, which rebuts the franchises’ single-entity 
defenses.199 
 
 190. Bautista Complaint, supra note 93, ¶¶ 2, 47–49. 
 191. Id. ¶¶ 15–17. 
 192. Id. ¶ 2. 
 193. Id. ¶ 52. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See Deslandes Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 87. 
 196. See id.  The no-poaching provision in a McDonald’s franchise agreement was limited 
to a six-month period. Id. 
 197. Bautista Complaint, supra note 93, ¶¶ 40–41, 45–47. 
 198. Id. ¶ 46.  The complaint notes that one CKE franchisee was quoted in a Wall Street 
Journal article stating that he “cho[oses] whom to hire.” Id. (alteration in original). 
 199. Strimel et al., supra note 57; see, e.g., Butler Complaint, supra note 93, ¶¶ 60, 77; Ion 
Complaint, supra note 93, ¶¶ 74–75. 
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D.  Validity of Recent Complaints 
As these cases are currently pending, a court has not yet ruled on this issue 
as a matter of law.  Although the rulings of the aforementioned no-poaching 
suits in the franchised food industry cannot be fully predicted, these suits are 
likely to multiply.200  This section examines the defendants’ pro-competitive 
justifications and explains why these justifications may be insufficient to 
evade a section 1 violation. 
1.  Defenses and Pro-Competitive Justifications 
Franchises may have valid legal justifications to defend the use of no-
poaching agreements if they are reasonably tailored to further pro-
competitive justifications.201  Some of these justifications, as discussed in 
Deslandes and other recent cases, include promoting interbrand competition 
among competing franchise chains and encouraging investment in employee 
training.202  Although the district court in Deslandes rejected both of these 
arguments, it made clear that narrowly tailored no-poaching provisions could 
serve the pro-competitive purpose of improving franchise investment in 
employee training by limiting the clause’s applicability to employees above 
a certain level or to employees who receive additional management 
training.203  Therefore, no-poaching agreements that are limited in scope, 
duration, geography, the category of employees to whom they apply, or some 
or all of these are likely to face less scrutiny with respect to antitrust issues 
compared to blanket no-poaching agreements that apply to all employees.204 
Defenders of no-poaching agreements have also argued that no-hire 
agreements are essential to the franchise model as they prevent free riding on 
training investments by the franchisees.205  For example, defendants contend 
that franchisees incur costs to provide specialized training to management-
level employees.206  This training may include sending the employees to 
corporate classes and providing one-on-one proprietary training for skills 
specific to the franchise system.207  The argument here is that franchisees 
could free-ride on these specialized investments by poaching employees after 
another franchisee incurs the training costs.208  This could effectively deter 
franchisees from providing the specialized training in the first place, which 
 
 200. See Strimel et al., supra note 57. 
 201. Paul Eckles et al., The Fight Against No-Poach Agreements Is Expanding, LAW360 
(Oct. 23, 2018, 1:09 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1094204/the-fight-against-no-
poach-agreements-is-expanding [https://perma.cc/H9BE-F35V]. 
 202. Id.; see also Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17-4857, 2018 WL 3105955, 
at *8 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018).  The court further recognized that McDonald’s continued to 
sign franchise agreements even after it removed the no-hire provision in 2017, which 
suggested that “the no-hire provision was not necessary to encourage franchisees to sign” the 
franchise agreement. Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at *7. 
 203. Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at *8. 
 204. Eckles et al., supra note 201. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See KRUEGER & POSNER, supra note 13, at 13. 
 207. See Strimel et al., supra note 57. 
 208. See id. 
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would be detrimental both to the company and the workers who are deprived 
of the training.209 
In addition to promoting intrabrand competition, or competition between 
two or more McDonald’s restaurants in different locations, defendants in 
these cases have argued that no-poaching provisions also promote interbrand 
competition, or competition with direct, horizontal competitors, such as 
Burger King and other fast-food restaurant chains.210  The court in 
Deslandes, however, found this argument unpersuasive.211  There, plaintiffs 
asserted that McDonald’s “divided the market for employees” by prohibiting 
restaurants from hiring each other’s current or former employees.212  In the 
labor market context, the individual franchises are competing brands.213  
Therefore, instead of promoting interbrand competition, the court found that 
dividing the market restrains intrabrand competition.214  If the labor market 
extends beyond just one franchise chain—including all fast food, all 
restaurants, or even all low-wage jobs in a particular geographic market—
then the market harm is broader than the alleged harm from a single no-
poaching agreement.215 
Whichever level of scrutiny the court applies in the franchise fast-food 
cases—be it per se, rule of reason, or quick-look216—plaintiffs will likely 
demonstrate harms resulting from the lack of competition among franchisees 
for their labor and the potential for lost mobility and depressed wages.217  
Ultimately, franchisors currently using no-poaching agreements or 
considering doing so should examine their own franchise structure in terms 
of its coordination and control over its franchisees.218  Furthermore, 
franchisors should assess whether their valid pro-competitive justifications 
for the agreement outweigh any anticompetitive effects.219 
2.  Economic and Social Policy Considerations 
Many employers have reiterated the defense of no-poaching agreements as 
a mode of protecting their investments in their employees.220  While this 
defense carries some validity in higher-skill and lower-turnover industries, it 
 
 209. See id. (explaining that this argument is rooted in allowing franchisees to reap the 
benefits of their investments). 
 210. See, e.g., Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17-4857, 2018 WL 3105955, 
at *8 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (citing McDonald’s and Burger King as examples of direct, 
interbrand competitors). 
 211. See supra Part III.B (explaining the court’s reasoning). 
 212. See, e.g., Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at *8. 
 213. See id. 
 214. See id. 
 215. See id. 
 216. See supra Part I.D (describing the different modes of analysis). 
 217. Strimel et al., supra note 57. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. See KRUEGER & POSNER, supra note 13, at 13. 
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is insufficient for blanket agreements in the fast-food industry.221  
Furthermore, there are a variety of more efficient ways to protect 
investments—such as employee incentive plans and a plethora of retention 
tools—which do not impede labor market competition in the same way no-
poaching agreements do.222  According to Wharton professor of management 
Peter Cappelli, “A no-poaching pact ‘benefits the companies at the expense 
of their employees.  Companies could achieve the same results by making it 
attractive enough for employees not to leave.’”223  An analogous argument 
can be made for no-poaching agreements between franchisors and 
franchisees.224  As noted, franchisors likewise have argued that no-poaching 
agreements within the franchise are critical for investment in their employees 
and lead to more specific training, but it is not clear whether the training 
would be lost to the franchise if no-poaching agreements were banned.225  If 
this defense holds true, then the companies concede that they are, in fact, 
separate economic actors.226  Otherwise, an employee who benefits from the 
training provided by one franchisee would be able to transfer those same 
skills to another franchisee without the franchisor losing out on its 
investment.227 
IV.  A PROPOSAL FOR CURRENT AND FUTURE FRANCHISE CASES 
Labor economics principles, along with no-poaching antitrust precedent 
and the current state of the single-entity doctrine, support the conclusion that 
no-poaching agreements in franchise systems operate in the same way as 
agreements in unfranchised systems.  Namely, no-poaching agreements in 
franchises similarly stagnate wages and restrict worker mobility.228  Based 
on the current state of the single-entity doctrine, this Part proposes that no-
poaching agreements in the franchise sector should be considered per se 
illegal.  In other words, regardless of categorization, no-poaching agreements 
should be banned entirely. 
American Needle challenges the Copperweld229 analysis employed in 
Williams and leaves the door open for litigation in the franchise sector.230  
 
 221. Id.; see also supra Parts II.B, III.B (using two case studies—one in the technology 
industry and the other in the fast-food industry—to demonstrate the differences). 
 222. KRUEGER & POSNER, supra note 13, at 13. 
 223. Silicon Valley’s No-Poaching Case, supra note 20. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. See id. 
 227. See id. 
 228. See supra Parts II.B, III (comparing no-poaching agreements in unfranchised and 
franchised systems). 
 229. See supra Part I.C.  The Copperweld doctrine holds that a parent company and its 
wholly owned subsidiary are incapable of conspiring because they share a community of 
interests. Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984).  The NFL is an 
example of a franchised enterprise that does not fall under the Copperweld doctrine.  The NFL 
was deemed to not be a single enterprise because it consisted of thirty-two teams that competed 
with one another, were independently managed, and held separate economic power. See Am. 
Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 201 (2010). 
 230. Davis, supra note 10, at 300 & n.137. 
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The Supreme Court has defined single entities as a parent company together 
with its wholly owned subsidiaries or, at a minimum, companies with “a 
complete unity of interest.”231  Franchises, like NFL football teams, are fully 
capable of conspiring with one another.232  Likewise, co-franchisees exist in 
a competitive relationship with each other for some purposes, including the 
hiring of employees.233  American Needle does not clarify whether Williams 
remains good law after the Supreme Court narrowed the definition of a 
“single economic entity,” which suggests that franchises may be viewed as 
independent companies that can conspire in violation of the Sherman Act.234 
The FTC and DOJ’s October 2016 guidance makes clear that companies 
that “compete to hire or retain employees are competitors in the employment 
marketplace, regardless of whether the firms make the same products or 
compete to provide the same services.”235  It is therefore unlawful for 
competitors to expressly or implicitly agree not to compete with one 
another.236  As noted, individual franchises compete with one another both 
for employees and customers.237  Following this line of analysis, economists 
have proposed that no-poaching agreements be uniformly banned regardless 
of whether they are used outside or within franchises.238  These proponents 
believe that a per se approach is appropriate because a franchise model can 
operate just as efficiently without imposing these types of hiring 
restrictions.239  From an economic point of view, no-poaching agreements 
violate section 1 of the Sherman Act regardless of the circumstances 
surrounding their use.240  Much like the agreements the Silicon Valley 
technology companies made, the no-poaching agreements in a franchise 
system harm workers by restricting their mobility across the labor market and 
preventing them from receiving higher wages and potentially better working 
conditions.241  As such, a per se rule against these agreements is appropriate. 
Plaintiffs in the foregoing class action franchise cases have relied on the 
government’s October 2016 guidance242 in arguing in support of a per se 
approach to no-poaching agreements.243  However, the DOJ recently stated 
 
 231. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771. 
 232. Marc Edelman, Why the “Single Entity” Defense Can Never Apply to NFL Clubs:  A 
Primer on Property-Rights Theory in Professional Sports, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 891, 893 (2008). 
 233. 3 ALTMAN & POLLACK, supra note 81, § 16:43. 
 234. See Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 188; see also KRUEGER & POSNER, supra note 13, at 11. 
 235. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, supra note 12, at 2. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See supra Parts I.C, III.A (describing competition broadly in the single-entity context 
and also in the franchise context). 
 238. See KRUEGER & POSNER, supra note 13, at 13. 
 239. See id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Letter from Elizabeth Warren and Cory A. Booker to Jeff Sessions, supra note 14, 
at 2; see supra Part II.B (discussing the In re High-Tech cases). 
 242. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, supra note 12. 
 243. Bryan Koenig, DOJ Gives Fast-Food Chains Ammo Against No-Poach Suits, LAW360 
(Jan. 29, 2019, 9:11 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1123203 [https://perma.cc/7F6D-
JYBT]. 
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that it intends to intervene to clarify that its guidance is inapplicable to 
franchise systems.244  By advocating for a stricter standard, the DOJ is 
essentially countering the argument that franchise no-poaching agreements 
are per se illegal.245  It must be noted, though, that the DOJ’s opinion is not 
binding on the judges who decide which standard is most appropriate to 
apply.246  The fate of these cases will turn on the facts specific to each case.247  
If courts decide to forgo a per se application, they should, in the alternative, 
employ a case-by-case heightened quick-look approach whereby they would 
scrutinize these types of agreements and balance the justifications against the 
harm to the employees.  In many cases, especially in the fast-food industry, 
the pro-competitive justifications do not outweigh the economic harm to 
already low-income workers.248  Under this approach, courts should rule in 
favor of the employees of these franchises given the broader economic and 
public policy implications.249 
CONCLUSION 
The Court in American Needle did not provide a clear framework for courts 
to use when dealing with the single-entity defense to liability under section 1 
of the Sherman Act.  While American Needle did not explicitly overrule the 
Copperweld decision, it opened the door for litigation in the franchise 
industry.  Courts should use this period of evolution and uncertainty to set 
out clear violations of no-poaching agreements in the franchise sector 
because their effects are substantially similar to no-poaching agreements 
between separate corporate entities.  This Note advocates for a per se rule 
against no-poaching agreements among franchisors and franchisees. 
 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
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 248. See KRUEGER & POSNER, supra note 13, at 14 (addressing the issues specific to low-
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 249. See supra Part III.D.2 (discussing, in detail, the economic and public policy 
considerations). 
